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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
to exercise discretion beyond that specified by statute in the dis-
position of actions brought before an inappropriate forum. The
court should be free to relieve a harassed defendant and to encourage
litigation in a forum better suited to a just result.
GERALD M. MAYO
Constitutional Law-First Amendment Profection of the
Right to Demonstrate-the "New" Limitations
Petitioners in Adderley v. Florida1 were among a group of
students engaged in integration efforts in Leon County, Florida.
On the day following the arrest of some of their fellows, approxi-
mately two hundred students including the thirty-two petitioners
marched to the Leon County jail. There they stood and sat upon the
jail premises, dancing, singing and clapping. In so doing they
partially obstructed a jail entrance and a jail driveway used by the
sheriff and his officers to transport prisoners, and by tradesmen
servicing the jail but not generally by the public. The sheriff, after
notifying the demonstrators that he was the legal custodian of the
jail, ordered them to leave or be arrested for trespass. Many left,
but 107 remained and were arrested. This included petitioners, who
were convicted of a violation of a Florida trespass statute.2 After
the Florida appellate court denied rehearing,8 the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.4 Upon hearing, a five justice majority deter-
mined that the convictions should be affirmed. The opinion, written
by Justice Black, made it clear that otherwise valid state trespass
convictions under properly worded statutes, nondiscriminatorily
applied, will not be invalidated because the purpose of the trespass
was the assertion of civil rights, and that in the case of trespass on
public lands, the court will test the propriety of regulation, not by
the purpose5 of the trespass, but by the use to which the property
is dedicated.
1385 U.S. 39 (1966).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 821.18 (1965). "Every trespass upon the property
of another, committed with a malicious and mischievous intent, the punish-
ment of which is not specifically provided for, shall be punished by im-
prisonment not exceeding three months, or by fine not exceeding one
hundred dollars."
8Adderley v. State, 175 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1965) (per curiam).
Adderley v. Florida, 382 U.S. 1023 (1966).
'I.e. "To petition . .. for redress of grievances," U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The affirmance of this conviction no doubt came as a surprise
to many, as it is the first Supreme Court decision upholding such a
conviction in the short but turbulent history of sit-in cases." This
absence of affirmances seems to have given rise to a largely un-
articulated belief that essentially all demonstrations against gov-
ernmental policy on state property are protected against state prose-
cution by the first amendment as made applicable to states by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment." A similar belief has
arisen that in cases involving demonstrations against racial segre-
gation, any prosecution is invalid as state action enforcing unequal
treatment of the races,0 and therefore a violation of the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment."0 But no holding by the
Court fully supported either of these beliefs or squarely refuted them.
Indeed these questions had seldom been reached. In no case prior
to Adderley had the majority of the Court found that the record
made out an otherwise valid conviction under an otherwise consti-
tutional statute properly applied, as may be seen by a brief review
of the leading sit-in cases.
In Garner v. Louisiana," the first sit-in case to reach the Su-
preme Court, petitioners, peaceful participants in sit-ins at the
"white" lunch counters of privately owned businesses, were charged
with a breach of the peace. Petitioners presented to the court, among
other contentions, the equal protection argument, based on the aid
of the criminal law in the maintenance of segregation.'- The Chief
While in Drews v. Maryland, 381 U.S. 421 (1965), the Court did not
overturn the disorderly conduct convictions of four sit-in demonstrators
tried before passage of the Public Accommodations Law, 78 Stat. 243, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000(a)-2000(a) (6) (1964), but who appealed after its pas-
sage, the Court refused review in a memorandum which gave neither indica-
tion of its grounds nor holding as to the validity of such convictions.
This belief is evidenced by the contention of petitioners in the principal
case, "that they had a constitutional right to stay on the property over thejail custodian's objections," 385 U.S. at 47; and by the premise of Justice
Douglas's dissenting opinion that the jailhouse, as "one of the seats of
government . . . is an obvious center of protest." Id. at 49 (dissenting
opinion of Douglas, J.).
'Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
'See, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242-60, 286-318 (1964) (con-
curring opinions of Douglas, J., and Goldberg, J.). While this question was
not squarely before the Court in the principal case, its relevance to the
decision will be discussed below.
10 See, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
1368 U.S. 157 (1961).
'Id. at 163.
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Justice, for the majority, found it "unnecessary to reach the broader
constitutional questions presented,"' 3 and reversed the case on the
ground that the record did not disclose "any evidence which would
support a finding that the petitioners' acts caused a disturbance of
the peace."' 4 Therefore, the Court held the convictions were with-
out due process of law.' 5
A 1963 case, Edwards v. South Carolina,6 presented an ap-
propriate fact situation for testing the applicability of first amend-
ment protection to demonstrations. These defendants were arrested
for breach of the peace while holding a non-violent demonstration
on the state capitol grounds as an expression of their grievances
regarding state policies. Here the Court came closer to reaching
the broad issues. It found that the first amendment rights to peace-
fully assemble and petition government were indeed infringed, but
made it clear that: "We do not review in this case criminal con-
victions resulting from the evenhanded application of a precise and
narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment
that a certain specific conduct will be limited or proscribed."' 7
The Court reversed four other 1963 convictions on a finding of
forbidden state action without reading the broader issues.'"
In early 1964 five more sit-in cases were decided by the Court,
and in four of them the Court found clear grounds for voiding the
judgments without reaching the broad issues."9 In the other case,
1 Id. at 163.
14Id. at 163-64.15Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960). The following year,
in Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962), the Court reversed a breach-
of-peace conviction arising out of a bus station sit-in by following Garner.18372 U.S. 229 (1963).17 Id. at 236.
18In Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of
Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963); and Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963), the convictions were in cities having segregation ordi-
nances. In Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963), an announcement
by city officials that sit-ins would not be permitted was held to be sufficient
state action to invalidate the conviction, even though the city had no segre-
gation ordinance.
.. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), the Court found
a violation of due process in that the statute under which petitioners were con-
victed did not give them fair warning of the prohibition of their acts. In
Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964), the Court reversed a conviction
arising out of a sit-in in a segregated restaurant on a finding of state
action in that a health regulation required separate toilet and lavoratory
facilities for the races. In Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964),
violation of due process was found on grounds of a want of evidence to
support the charge. The conviction in Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130
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Bell v. Maryland,2 ° a majority of the Court (six justices) actually
reached the broad equal protection issue, but divided evenly with
three holding that enforcement of a state trespass statute against
demonstrators who were ordered to leave because of their race was
a discriminatory state action2 ' and three that it was not.22 The other
justices favored reversal on other grounds.'
Ten days after the decision in Bell v. Maryland, the relative im-
portance of the broad unconstitutional state action theory for void-
ing sit-in convictions lost much of its importance when the Public
Accommodations Act24 became law. The segregation of most poten-
tial sit-in sites became illegal, so that police protection of the right
to segregate property became largely irrelevant. 2  Therefore, most
of the controversy after the enactment of the statute is primarily
concerned with the first amendment doctrine that was to become
the principal issue in Adderley.
This issue was raised twice more in important decisions before
Adderley. In the Cox v. Louisiana2 6 decisions, as had been the case
in Edwards, the facts were ideal for testing the extent to which the
first amendment protects the activities of demonstrators. These
cases arose out of street demonstrations protesting segregation and
the arrest of other demonstrators then held in a jail located in a
courthouse across the street from the site of the demonstrations.
The leader of these demonstrations was convicted under state statutes
prohibiting disturbance of the peace,27 obstructing public passage-
(1964), was reversed on grounds of unconstitutional state action in that
the order excluding Negroes came from a uniformed deputy sheriff.
2 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
"I1d. at 242 (opinion of Douglas, J.); Id. at 286 (opinion of Gold-
berg, J.).2 Id. at 318 (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
" The Maryland legislature had enacted a public accommodations statute,
MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B § 11 (Supp. 1963), after the conviction of peti-
tioner but before the decision of the Supreme Court. It was the sense of
the three justices that the Court should remand for reconsideration in light
of the change in state law.
2'78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000(a)-(a)(6) (1964), held consti-
tutional in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
5This is true even as to sit-ins occurring prior to passage of the act,
since the Court held on the same day the act was declared constitutional
that it brought abatement. Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964)(5- to -4 decision).20379 U.S. 536 (1964); 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
2
"LA. Rv. STAT. § 14:103.1 (Supp. 1962).
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ways 8 and picketing in or near a courthouse.- In the first of the
Cox decisions, the Court reversed the first two of these convictions.
But, as in Edwards, the basis of reversal was narrow enough to
leave questions as to the view of the majority regarding the broad
proposition. The Court did hold that by the breach-of-peace con-
viction Louisiana "infringed appellant's rights of free assembly by
convicting him under this statute.""0 In so doing, the Court indi-
cated that the elements of demonstration, including singing, cheering,
foot-stamping, and clapping, are protected forms of expression, but
tied this determination to a holding that the conviction could not be
sustained because:
The statute ...as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court, is unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad
scope . . . [as one element of the crime was] . . .congregating
. . . with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under cir-
cumstances such that a brecah of the peace may be occasioned.3 '
As the Louisiana court in applying this element defined "breach
of the peace" as including agitation or arousal from a state of repose,
the Supreme Court held that a person might be punished for the
peaceful expression of unpopular views, so that his first amendment
rights would be infringed.82 This finding of unconstitutionality for
overbreadth prevented the opinion from being of much probative
value in seeking a test for the propriety of governmental regulation
of demonstrations.
The Court's treatment of the other two charges gave little aid
in defining the scope of first amendment coverage of demonstrations.
In reversing the conviction for obstructing passageways, the Court
stated:
We emphatically reject the notion urged by appellant that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of
freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct
such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and high-
ways, as these amendments afford to those who would com-
municate ideas by pure speech.38
'LA. RE V. STAT. § 14:100.1 (Supp. 1962).
LA. REV. STAT. § 14:401 (Supp. 1962).
o Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965).
'Id. at 551, quoting State v. Cox, 244 La. 1087, 1105, 156 So. 2d 448,
455 (1963).
Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
"Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 545, 555 (1965).
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But as the application of the statute by city officials was held to
be discriminatory, the Court did not reach the broad question. Then,
in reversing the conviction for picketing near a courthouse in the
second of the Cox opinions,"4 the Court made dearer the import of
the first opinion that the same standards will not apply in testing
the propriety of regulating picketing as in the case of ordinary
speech.35 The Court found that the Louisiana statute was consti-
tutional on its face. 6 However, it found that the application of
the statute was a violation of due process, but on grounds so narrow
that they have little precedential value beyond the particular facts
of the case.37
The last of the cases requiring close examination before Adder-
ley was Brown v. Louisiana,"s another case presenting an appro-
priate situation for examination of the application of the first
amendment through the fourteenth, and the case in which the pre-
vailing opinion 9 reached the issue most broadly. Petitioners had
entered a public library, which some of the evidence indicated prac-
ticed segregation. One of them handed the librarian a card bearing
the name of a book. The librarian had searched for the book and
finding it not to be on her shelves told petitioners that she would
order it for them. At this point, the librarian testified, she expected
them to leave. Instead, one of petitioners sat down in the only
chair in the room, and the others stood around him. After they
had refused to leave at the request of the librarian and her superior,
the two ladies called the sheriff. He repeated the request, and when
petitioners still did not leave arrested them under another clause
" Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 545, 559 (1965).
" The Court held that "the fact that free speech is intermingled with...
conduct does not bring with it constitutional protection," and that the
"clear and present danger" test is not necessarily applicable when speech
is not in its "pristine form." Id. at 564, 566.
" The state legislation described by Justice Goldberg as "a valid law,
dealing with conduct subject to regulation so as to vindicate important
interests of society," id. at 564, was modeled on a federal statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1507 (1964), drafted by members of the Supreme Court.
"' The reversal turned on an entrapment theory based on an "adminis-
trative determination" of the meaning of the word "near" by police officials
present at the demonstration.
"383 U.S. 131 (1966).
"There was no true majority opinion as the five justices supporting
reversal spoke in three separate opinions in a 3-1-1 split. The decision of
the Court was announced in the opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Douglas. It is to this opinion that the term
"prevailing opinion" is applied herein.
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of the same breach of the peace statute tested in the first Coxz opin-
ion. After noting that the conviction was reversible on the same
basis of statutory construction as in Cox, the opinion went on to
express more explicitly than in any other case the view that the
first amendment offers a broad protection of expression by physical
presence:
We are dealing here with an aspect of a basic constitutional
right-the right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
guaranteeing freedom of speech and of assembly, and freedom to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances ... [T]hese
rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace ap-
propriate types of action which certainly include the right in a
peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproach-
ful presence . . . the unconstitutional segregation of public
facilities.40
Thus the prevailing opinion indicated that the first amendment
guarantees the right to use the property of others, or at least that of
the government, as a platform for the expression by physical demon-
stration of dissident opinions. This holding, taken in the light of
similar but narrower holdings in the Edwards and Cox decisions,
presented the best evidence of the law as to first amendment pro-
tection of the right to demonstrate. Protection was to be complete,
so long as the demonstrators met two tests: the presence must be
for the purpose of expression; and the demonstration must be
orderly.
Nine months later came Adderley v. Florida. The Court ren-
dered its surprising opinion applying Black's new use test. How-
ever, the opinion in Adderley, despite the growing definiteness of
statement and breadth of protection from Edwards to Cox to Brown,
was not actually novel and need not have been surprising, for a line
of separate opinions at least two years long had foreshadowed the
shape of constitutional doctrines to come. As the pronouncements
of the Court became stronger, as the protection of demonstration
proved broader, the number of adherents became correspondingly
smaller. The clear indications that the Court would one day greatly
restrict the constitutional protection of expression by trespass be-
gan with the dissenting opinion in Bell v. Maryland,41 over two
years before Adderley.
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
' The contention that petitioners had a constitutional right to enter
(Vol. 45
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It is true that the major issue in Bell was the applicability of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to use of
state criminal laws in cases of sit-ins in segregated establishments.
But it is equally true that petitioners raised the due process-First
amendment aspect of the fourteenth, and that the dissent dealt spe-
cifically with the issue. Justice Black, speaking for himself and
Justices White and Harlan, described the argument as coming down
to this:
That since petitioners did not shout, obstruct Hooper's busi-
ness .... make speeches, or display picket signs, handbills, or
other means of communication, they had a perfect constitutional
right to assemble and remain . . . over the owner's continuing
objections, for the purpose of expressing themselves by lan-
guage and demonstrations... 42
Significantly Justice Black's rewording of petitioners' argument
bears striking resemblance to the test prescribed in Brown, and
significantly he resoundingly rejected it.43 Though this case is not
directly parallel to Adderley since the demonstration in Bell oc-
curred on private property, this dissent is a clear rejection of the
liberal protection doctrine over two years before the Adderley
decision.
Then in Cox, four justices rejected the broad first amendment
view. Justice Black, while concurring in the reversal of the breach-
of-peace and obstructing-public-passageways convictions, did so
solely on the basis of constitutional impropriety of the particular
statutes in the case. He felt that the first statute44 was violative of
due process as it was broad, vague and not so narrowly drawn as
to assure nondiscriminatory application, and so was constitutionally
invalid under the holding in Edwards. Black made it clear, though,
that this narrow basis was his only ground for concurring, and that
his joining in the opinion in Edwards had never indicated that he
accepted the broad view of first amendment protection of demon-
strations, as he wrote:
or to stay on Hooper's premises against his will because, if there,
they would have had a constitutional right to express their desire
S.. is a bootstrap argument. The right to freedom of expression is
a right to express views-not a right to force other people to supply
a platform or a pulpit.
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 345 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
'-Id. at 344.3 Id. at 345.
"LA. Rav. STAT. § 14:103.1 (Supp. 1962).
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Edwards... as I understand it, did not hold that either private
property owners or the States are constitutionally required to sup-
ply a place for people to exercise freedom of speech or assembly.
... What Edwards as I read it did hold, and correctly I think,
was not that the Federal Constitution prohibited South Carolina
from making it unlawful for people to congregate, picket, and
parade on or near that State's capitol grounds, but rather that in
the absence of a clear, narrowly drawn, nondiscriminatory statute
prohibiting such gatherings and picketing, South Carolina could
not punish people for assembling at the capitol to petition for
redress of grievances.45
Also, while Black concurred in reversing the conviction under the
obstructing-public-passageways statute,46 he did so on grounds that
the statute, because of exclusions therein, was discriminatory,4 7 and
he made it clear that this did not indicate any weakening of his
views as to the broad proposition.4
The other two dissenters from Bell, White and Harlan, reiter-
ated their belief that conduct is not so protected by the first amend-
ment as is speech. In a joint opinion written by White, they con-
curred in reversal of the breach-of-peace conviction, but did so
saying: "I do not agree with everything the Court says concerning
the... conviction, particularly its statement concerning the unquali-
fied protection to be extended to Cox's exhortations to engage in
sit-ins. . .. ,,41 These two justices dissented in the reversal. of the
obstructing-passageways conviction, agreeing with Black that a
properly drawn statute can be used to regulate picketing and march-
ing, and finding that the Louisiana statute was not discriminatory or
improperly drawn.
In addition to the reiteration of position by the dissenters from
Bell, Cox brought an increase in their number as Justice Clark,"
" Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578-79 (1965) (separate opinion of
Black, J.).
"LA. REv. STAT. 14:100.1 (Supp. 1962).
" Cf., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561(1938).do "t°I have no doubt about the general power of Louisiana to bar all
picketing on its streets and highways. Standing, patrolling, or marching
back and forth is conduct, not speech, and as conduct can be regulated and
prohibited." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (separate opinion
of Black, J.).
,
9 Id. at 591. (Separate opinion of White, J.)
80 Clark had earlier indicated his inclination as he was the lone dissenter
in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (dissenting opin-
ion of Clark, J.).
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one of the three not reaching broad issues in Bell, filed his separate
opinion. He concurred in reversal of the breach-of-peace and
obstructing-passageways convictions, but, like Black, did so on
narrow grounds, as he stated his agreement with Black on the
broader first amendment question.51
Finally, in the Brown case, the coming of Adderley was shown
to be not only probable but reasonably certain. Black, in a dissenting
opinion for four justices,52 laid down the interpretation of the first
amendment's scope that was to prevail in Adderley:
The First Amendment ...protects speech, writings, and ex-
pression of views in any manner in which they can be legitimately
and validly communicated. But I have never believed that it
gives any person or group of persons the constitutional right to
go wherever they want, whenever they please, without regard to
the rights of public or private property or to state law.53
After repudiating the broad view of the first amendment, Black
set out the "use" test that he would later apply for the majority in
Adderley, as he distinguished Brown from Cox on the basis of the
sites of the two demonstrations."
While it is true that this foreshadowing of the Adderley opinion
is still the voice of a four-justice minority, these are not exactly the
same four justices who had expressed similar views previously.
Justice Stewart, who had not reached the issue in Bell and had
been with the majority in Cox, joined in Black's dissent in Brown,
placing himself on the side of those who find demonstrations to be
outside the scope of general application of the First Amendment.
Justice White, who had sided with Black in the earlier decisions,
voted with the majority favoring reversal of the Brown conviction,
but did so in a separate opinion, on narrow factual grounds, making
"' "I ... agree with him [Black] that the statute prohibiting obstruction
of public passageways is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. And
. ..I arrive at the same conclusion for the same reason on the question
regarding the breach of the peace statute." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
589 (1965) (separate opinion of Clark, J.).
" Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (dissenting opinion
of Black, J.).
53Id. at 166.
' "Public buildings such as libraries, schoolhouses, fire departments,
courthouses, and executive mansions are maintained to perform certain
specific and vital functions. Order and tranquility of a sort entirely un-
known to the public streets are essential to the normal operation." Id. at
157 (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
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clear that he had not changed his view as to the broad proposition.55
If Justice White had considered the statute in this case to be
properly drawn, and its application properly made, the opinion of
Justice Black would have been not the dissent but by the majority.
So in Brown, nine months before Adderley, it became clear that if a
case came before the Supreme Court involving conviction of demon-
strators under a statute that was clear, narrowly drawn, and non-
discriminatory, a majority of the court5" was not going to find a
violation of the first amendment simply because expression by dem-
onstration was limited. The conviction in Adderley was made under
such a statute5 7 and the Court reached not a surprising conclusion
but the exact result foreshadowed in Brown. The five-justice ma-
jority voted to uphold the conviction.
Black, now writing for a majority, rejected with great clarity
the view that the first amendment offers full protection to expression
by physical entry:
[P]etitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to
stay on the property, over the jail custodian's objections . . .
has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption that
people who want to propagandize protests or views have a consti-
tutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever
they please. That concept of constitutional law [is] vigorously
and forthrightly rejected .... 58
Black then announced with equal force the view adopted by the
majority. So long as the regulation of the use of state owned prop-
erty is evenhanded and not directed at the particular views being
expressed,59 the power of the state to bar citizens from its property
or restrict them from protest activities while thereon does not con-
"' Were it clear ... that lingering in a public library for 10 minutes
... contravened some explicit statute, ordinance, or library regulation
of general application, or even if it were reasonably clear that a
10-minute interlude ... exceeded what is generally contemplated as a
normal use of a public library, I would have difficulty joining in a re-
versal of this case . . . Nor would I deem the First Amendment to
forbid a municipal regulation limiting loafing in library reading rooms.
Id. at 150 (separate opinion of White, J.).
" Justices Black, White, Clark, Stewart, and Harlan.
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 821.18 (1965).
T Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966).
'f There is not a shred of evidence that this power [of the sheriff to
exclude from the jail premises] was exercised ... because the sheriff
objected to what was being sung or said by the demonstrators or
because he disagreed with the objectives of their protests .... There
is no evidence that on any other occasion had similarly large groups
[Vol. 45
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flict with the first amendment, so long as such regulation is con-
sistent with the nature of the property. °
The wisdom of Black's opinion may perhaps be best assessed by
subjecting it to the examination of dissent, i.e. the dissent of
Justice Douglas for himself and three other justices.61 The dissent-
ers insist that the conviction of petitioners infringes their right "to
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of griev-
ances."0  To support this proposition, Douglas makes much of the
fact that the purpose of petitioners' presence was one of expression,
asserting that this fact brings it within the scope of first amendment
protection.0 The dissent also deems it important that the sheriff,
"well understood the purpose of the rally," and that the testimony as
to the purpose "was not contradicted or even questioned."" Yet
such language in the dissent does nothing to weaken Black's thesis,
nor, in real sense, to even criticize it. Black well knew that the
purpose of the trespassers was to express their views. His whole opin-
ion makes that clear, but he and the majority simply found this
purpose to be irrelevant. A crime had been committed. A con-
viction had been obtained that the majority found to be constitu-
tional. 60  That the guiding principles which led the trespassers to
violate the statute were believed by them to be of greater virtue
than the principles of those who governed the state did not, in the
eyes of the majority, take the act out of the scope of the criminal
statute or bring it within the scope of the first amendment. Black
was even able to cite authority concurred in by three of the dissenters
... been permitted to gather on this portion of the jail grounds for
any purpose.
Id. at 47.
1 Black stated for the majority: -"The State, no less than a private owner
of property, has the power to preserve the property under its control for the
use to which it is lawfully dedicated." Id. at 47. "The United States Consti-
tution does not forbid a State to control the use of its own property for
its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose." Id. at 48.
" Id. at 48 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J., with whom the Chief
justice and Brennan and Fortas, Jj., concur).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
a8 "There is no question that petitioners had as their purpose a protest
against the arrest of Florida A. & M. students for trying to integrate public
theatres . . . and state and local policies of segregation. . . ." 385 U.S. at
51 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
"Id. at 51 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
6Id. at 51.
" Even the dissent did not find the statute invalid in its general appli-
cation.
1967] !
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supporting this proposition.67 Thus the dissent and the opinion
of the majority do not each criticize the reasoning of the other,
rather they present two squarely opposed premises. Of the two,
Black's thesis seems preferable. The theory of the dissent implies
that no entry can be regulated where the trespasser holds dissident
views and the person in charge of the premises knows that the
trespasser entered to express those views. Justice Douglas's thesis
invites a situation in which nurses would have to pick their way
among supine demonstrators to attend their patients; in which
teachers would have to peer over the signs of pickets to inspect the
decorum of their classes; in which jail administrators would be
hampered in the transportation of their prisoners by the presence of
singing, dancing, shouting crowds. The view of the dissent would
find all these and innumerable equally unpalatable eventualities
justified by the simple fact that the demonstrators had first notified
the custodian of the premises of an intent to express opinion by their
presence. The five justices of the majority seem justified in finding
this prospect undesirable.
The dissent goes on to complain, in support of the theory that
the conviction is violative of the first amendment, that: "[T] he jail-
house grounds were not marked with 'NO TRESPASSING !' signs,
nor does respondent claim that the public was generally excluded
from the grounds. Only the sheriff's fiat transformed lawful con-
duct into unlawful trespass.""8 Yet as Black pointed out, "the
sheriff, as jail custodian, had power . . . to direct that this large
crowd of people get off the grounds," 9 and petitioners were not
arrested until the sheriff had twice ordered them to leave and
apprised them of his position as custodian of the jail. What greater
strength the erection of "no trespassing" signs could have added
to this order can go only to the exclusion of the public generally.
While it is true that there is no evidence that the public generally
was excluded, it is equally true, as Black pointed out, that there was
no evidence that any other part of the public had ever held a mass
" "The conduct which is the subject of this statute-picketing and parad-
ing-is subject to regulation even though intertwined with expression and
association." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1964). This opinion
was joined by Douglas, Warren, and Brennan. Fortas was not yet on the
Court. See, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
But cf., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
8 385 U.S. at 52.
00 Id. at 46-47.
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meeting on the premises or remained there after an order to leave.
Finally, the dissent admits that Black's "use" test for defining
the outer limits of the state's power to exclude demonstrators from
its premises has validity.70 But then Douglas goes on to say, " [T] his
is quite different from saying that all public places are off limits to
people with grievances." 71 Indeed it is quite different, but Douglas
has set us a straw man. Black at no point suggests that all public
places are or should be off limits. In fact, in distinguishing the
principal case from Edwards, Black makes clear that this is not his
position as he points out that, "Traditionally, state capitol grounds
are open to the public. Jails, built for security purposes, are not."72
In further attacking the majority opinion, the dissent suggests
that the Court's holding would place in the discretion of the cus-
todian of public property the power to determine when the property
shall be used to express ideas. This power, Douglas argues, would
give the custodian, "the awesome power to decide whose ideas may
be expressed, and who shall be denied a place to air their claims and
petition their government."'7 However, the power which the ma-
jority recognizes as being vested in the custodian is not an unbridled
one, nor is it awesome. A custodian may not decide who may
express views and who may not. The custodian may only perform
his function of administering the property evenhandedly according
to its dedicated use.
In short, the majority in the principal case is not announcing a
novel doctrine granting a new and frightful power to state em-
ployees. Instead, it is rendering a predictable opinion recognizing
that the administration of property is impossible if its use by the
public is not confined to purposes at least akin to its normal function.
An examination of Black's opinion is not completed by a con-
trast of constitutional theories. It must be noted that other con-
siderations were in the minds of the majority. These considera-
tions are more fully reflected in Black's dissent in Browrnz4 than in
70 "There may be some public places which are so clearly committed to
other purposes that their use for the airing of grievances is anomalous.
There may be some instances in which assemblies and petition for redress
of grievances are not consistent with other necessary purposes of public
property." Id. at 54.711 Id. at 54.
72 Id. at 41.
73 Id. at 54.7" Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966) (dissenting opinion
of Black, J.).
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his opinion in Adderley. Black and those who joined with him were
concerned that a failure to enforce laws against demonstrators was
part of a dangerous trend. Their concern is displayed in two state-
ments of the Brown dissent. First:
It is high time to challenge the assumption in which too many
people have too long acquiesced, that groups that think they
have been mistreated or that have actually been mistreated have
a constitutional right to use the public's streets, buildings, and
property to protest whatever, wherever, whenever they want,
without regard to whom such conduct may disturb7
5
And the closing statement of the dissent:
But I say once more that the crowd moved by noble ideals
today can become the mob ruled by hate and passion and greed
and violence tomorrow. If we ever doubted that, we know it
now. The peaceful songs of love can become as stirring and
provocative as the Marseillaise did in the days when a noble
revolution gave way to rule by successive mobs until chaos set in.
The holding in this case today makes it more necessary than ever
that we stop and look more closely at where we are going.7"
The weight of this concern in the formation of the views ex-
pressed in this dissent and in the principal case is subject to deep
inquiry. Black, the great exponent of first amendment liberties,
77
is apparently reading history and finding the forerunner of the
protest demonstration, not in pamphleteering of Thomas Payne or
the dissident speaking of Edmond Burke, but in the violent revolu-
tionaries of nineteenth century France. He who long has advo-
cated the first amendment protection of ideas,7" now fears that this
departure from traditional Anglo-American forms of protest will
end in mobs unwilling to rest on the merits of their ideas, but
bent upon prevailing through the physical strength of their adher-
ents. While the degree to which these fears influenced Black's
decision is not subject to exact measurement, they must necessarily
be considered by all who would study this opinion and reflect on
future decisions.
The effect of this case will certainly be great. Protest demonstra-
5 Id. at 162.
7a Id. at 168.
" See Calm, Juistice Black and First Amendment "Absolutes": A Pub-
lic Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 549 (1962).
"See, e.g., Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 501 (1944) (dis-
senting opinion of Black, J.).
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lion is certainly not dead. But state governments may now be
assured that so long as their regulations are clear and narrowly
drawn, and so long as their administration is nondiscriminatory,
they may protect public property from invasion by demonstrators
unless the nature of such property is such that its use for mass
assembly is appropriate.7" Conversely, those who would demon-
strate should be warned that in planning their protests they should
incline toward the selection of sites in which public assemblies are
normal or have previously or traditionally occurred, and where they
will not unduly interrupt some administrative or judicial function
of government.
It is unclear what effect this opinion will have on cases arising
out of civil rights demonstrations in the segregated accommodations
of private persons. As indicated above, the view that the first amend-
ment prevented prosecution of demonstrators generally has been
held in conjunction with a view that the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth protected from prosecution for trespass those who
were ordered from the property of others because of their race. This
question was not, of course, before the Court in Adderley.s° How-
ever, the opinion may be of some aid in predicting the probable re-
sult when the question does arise."1 Since three of the six justices
who reached the equal protection issue in Bell v. Marylands2 re-
jected the demonstrators' arguments, and since these same three,
joined by two others, have now found that demonstrators, even on
public property, are not insulated from convictions for trespass by
the motives behind their entry, it seems likely that future protestors
holding sit-ins in establishments not covered by the Public Ac-
commodations Act would certainly not be protected by the first
amendment and probably not by the equal protection clause of the
"' Various parts of Black's opinion suggest that capital grounds, public
parks, and to a limited extent the streets are among those places appropriate
for demonstration.
8 Petitioners did raise this issue by claiming that they were entitled
to abatement under the doctrine of Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 229(1964), as their protests had been directed toward segregated facilities.
The Court found this contention untenable.
"i There is a greater likelihood of the issue's arising than might at first
appear. True, the Public Accommodations Act, 78 Stat 743, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000(a)-(a) (6) (1964), made segregation of most establishments un-
lawful. But the act did leave certain exceptions. (E.g. sellers of food for
off-premises consumption, providers of lodging for transients with accommo-
dations for fewer than six in the residence of the proprietor, possibly op-
erators of participant sports centers).82378 U.S. 226, 318 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
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fourteenth. Therefore those who would urge integration of the re-
maining lawfully segregated establishments would be well advised
to do so by boycott, lawful picketing, or other means not involving
the invasion of the segregated property. Otherwise, they run the
risk of sustained convictions under clear, narrowly-drawn statutes.
DAvID B. SENTELLE
Constitutional Law-State Cannot Award Damages for Invasion
of Privacy Without Proof of Actual Malice
The United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' held that a state court could not constitutionally award
damages i~a a libel suit by a public official against a critic of his
official conduct without a showing of actual malice-that defendant
knew the statement was false or that there was a reckless disregard
for its truth. The malice requirement has since been extended to
a prosecution under a state criminal libel statute.2 In the recent
case of Time, Inc. v. Hill,3 the Court extended the malice require-
ment to a civil action for damages brought under a state invasion of
privacy statute.4
In September of 1952 plaintiff Hill and his family were held
hostage for nineteen hours in their home outside Philadelphia. The
captors-three escaped convicts-then released the family unharmed.
The following spring, a novel5 was published describing "the ex-
perience of a family of four held hostage by three escaped convicts
in the family's suburban home."' The family in the novel suffered
violence and verbal abuse at the hands of the convicts, while the
Hill family had not. When a play made from the book opened for
1376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). New York Times and
Garrison involved respectively a city commissioner and state criminal courtjudges-all clearly "public officials." In Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75(1966) the public official concept was extended to include a commissioner
of a county ski recreation area.
"385 U.S. 374 (1967).
'N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51. Section 50 makes the use "for ad-
vertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture
of any living person" without that person's consent, a misdemeanor. Section
51 gives any person whose name is so used, remedies in the form of actions
for an injunction and for damages.
HArTs, TuE DESPERATE HouRs (1953).
"385 U.S. at 378.
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